Efficient coordination mechanisms for selfish scheduling Ioannis Caragiannis
Web and Internet Economics | SpringerLink
On approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games with polynomial latencies
Ioannis Caragiannis - CatalyzeX
PDF) On Low-Envy Truthful Allocations
Approximation algorithms and mechanism design for ... - Corelab
arXiv:1807.10684v4 [cs.GT] 17 Mar 2021
Euro-Par 2012: Parallel Processing Workshops | SpringerLink
Ioannis Caragiannis | DeepAI
Seetang Lieber spülen ioannis diakopoylos φεισμπουκ Rauch Ausdrücklich Cutter
Ioannis Caragiannis
Ioannis Caragiannis | DeepAI
Seetang Lieber spülen ioannis diakopoylos φεισμπουκ Rauch Ausdrücklich Cutter
Ioannis Caragiannis - Workshop on Game Theoretic Aspects of Distributed Computing
PDF) Voting Almost Maximizes Social Welfare Despite Limited Communication.
Ioannis Caragiannis - Research - Aarhus University
Alexandros Voudouris
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Efficient coordination mechanisms for selfish scheduling Ioannis Caragiannis
PPT - Approximating Lewis Carroll's Voting Rule PowerPoint Presentation - ID:2196409
Design and analysis of algorithms for non-cooperative environments
CARAGIANNIS Ioannis
Approximation algorithms and mechanism design for minimax approval voting Ioannis Caragiannis Dimitris Kalaitzis University of Patras Vangelis Markakis. - ppt download
